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The Data: Knowns and Unknowns
A STATISTICAL study naturally begins with an appraisal of the underlying
data, in this case, official Soviet statistics. Discussion tends to get focused
on defects, more easily seen than virtues, and this carries with it the
danger that the basic statistics may seem to be worse than they are.
Almost every economist in no matter what field of empirical research
soon becomes convinced, as he gets familiar with his materials, that no
data could be as bad as those he is forced to work with. He has explored
the defects more thoroughly than others have. Heeding this lesson, we
should weigh the good features with the bad before passing judgment.
As we shall see, Soviet statistics, despite their serious shortcomings, do
form a basis for studying industrial growth when used with care.
The statistics relevant to a study of industrial growth fall into several
categories: output of industries, prices and related cost data,
labor and capital inputs, and aggregative measures. The discussion here
will center on only the first of these, namely, output of individual in-
dustries expressed in physical terms. The other types of data will be
discussed at appropriate points in other chapters.
Th&discussion cannot be exhaustive but will concentrate on some of
the more significant points.Fortunately, the subject has already been
treated very carefully and thoroughly by Professor Gregory Grossman
in an earlier report in this series,' which should be consulted by those
interested in a more detailed analysis. That excellent study is, in fact,
the basis of much that will be said here.
Introductory Remarks
The defects of Soviet statistics on physical output are important and must
be understood if the data are not to be misused. There are three major
shortcomings, all deriving from the nature of the Soviet political and eco-
nomic orders. The first is the selectivity of published data, a factor that
works in two opposing directions. On the one hand, some areas of poor
performance are shielded from view, causing the published data to
underrepresent slower-growing sectors of industry. On the other hand,
some of the more rapidly expanding economic activities associated with
the military sector are also not reported on.It is impossible to determine
1GregoryGrossman, Soviet Statistics of Physical Output of Industrial Commodities:Their
Compilation and Quality,Princetonfor National Bureau of Economic Research, 1960.
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whether the net effect is to promote an overstatement or an understate-
ment of growth. As we shall see, the degree of selectivity has varied
considerably over the years.For a long stretch of time, from 1938 to
1956, almost no data were published on the absolute level of output in
any sectors of industry.
The second shortcoming is ambiguity. Primary sources generally do
not contain adequate definitions of industries in terms of administrative
and territorial coverage, product coverage, and stage of fabrication at
which output is being measured. Titles given to industries can be mislead-
ing—for example, "silk fabrics" are chiefly rayon—and slight verbal
changes may signify a basic change in definition not otherwise described.
Things are not always what they seem to be, and the user of Soviet data
should beware. In the end, he still will have to use many data whose
meaning he does not fully comprehend, and conclusions should be quali-
fied on this account.
The third shortcoming is the general overstatement of absolute levels
of output within the Plan period for the sample of industries reported on.
The lower the priority of an industry from the Soviet point of view and the
less precisely its output can be measured, the greater the overstatement is
likely to be, for reasons to be developed later. That much can be said,
but no more; we cannot now place an order of magnitude on the over-
statement, in the large or in the small. The tendency toward overstate-
ment needs to be taken into account most when levels of output are being
compared between the Soviet Union and other countries.It has less
bearing on internal measures of growth, since it is doubtful that relative
oversthtement of output has increased systematically with time, except
with respect to prerevolutionary and early Soviet years. Hence growth
will, on this count, be overstated relative to, say, 1913 or 1928 but not
necessarily relative to later base years. Over later spans of years growth
may be overstated, understated, or more or less accurately reflected by the
available output data, the effect depending on specific circumstances,
some of which cannot now be adequately known.
Offsetting these shortcomings is another feature of the Soviet system:
the large volume of economic statistics collected and processed.As
Professor Devons has tersely put it, "Without statistics there can be no
planning."2 It is a curious fact that the United States, lying more or less
at the opposite pole from centralized planning, is probably the only other
country as figure-minded asthe Soviet Union—for quite different
2ElyDevons, Planning in Practice:Essays in Aircraft Planning in Wartime, Cambridge,
Eng., 1950, p. 133.
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reasons, of course. The question of quality and reliability aside, the vol-
ume of output data flowing out of the Soviet Union during interwar
years and since 1956 has been large by normal standards, despite the
policy of selective publication.Quantity substitutes to some extent for
quality.
When all is said, Soviet data, with their many faults, do provide a
basis for assessing Soviet industrial performance and growth, if carefully
used and interpreted. This is shown most convincingly by the fact that
growth patterns derived from using these data make economic sense.
There is a basic internal consistency in the figures; differential rates of
growth conform in direction with developments that can be directly
observed; certain phenomena appear that are characteristic of economic
growth everywhere, such as retardation in growth of individual industries;
and changes in industrial structure are shown that are otherwise known to
have occurred. These and other lines of evidence on the reliability of
the data will be developed more fully at later points in this and other
chapters.
But the faults remain to affect the accuracy of measures of growth, and
we turn now to discuss them more fully.Since most of the difficulties
stem from the nature of the Soviet system and its statistical appa-
ratus, we begin with a review of their salient features as they affect the
reliability of statistics.
General Characteristics of Soviet Statistics
Fault can be found with the economic statistics of every couiltry. They
represent, in the first place, a mere sampling of the unbounded volume
of data that might be recorded. They have been collected with specific
objectives in mind—more varied and far-reaching in some countries than
in others— and will therefore be of varying use depending on the purposes
they are made to serve. They contain, in the second place, errors intro-
duced at different stages of observation and assemblage.These will
depend on the state of statistical literacy among the collectors and
suppliers of data, on the effort expended on record-keeping, and on the
degree of active competition in gathering and analyzing data. They are,
finally, subject to manipulation and distortion by parties with a stake in
the figures, checked only to the extent that there are independent fact-
seekers and fact-gatherers with competing interests. No government or
other statistical agency can be relied upon to resist the temptation to
stretch figures to its own account if it feels it can get away with it.
Progress in economic statistics has been driven in the West by two
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engines: competition and technical sophistication. An extreme example
is perhaps provided by the. United States, a country unique in its long
tradition of figure-gathering.Thumbnail historiesusually mislead,
particularly when they treat the causes of some institutional development,
but we may perhaps be allowed to speculate very briefly on the evolution
of the American statistical system in order to illustrate its basic character-
istics and how they differ from those of the Soviet system.
The habit of collecting statistics was formed early, with a constitutional
requirement of a decadal census for the purpose of apportioning political
representation. Existence of a large market economy led to demands for
expanding economic intelligence on the part of legislators who made
the laws defining the economy, businessmen who organized it, and scholars
who studied it. The government census gradually expanded to cover an
increasing area of economic statistics, and special censuses ultimately
evolved. At the same time, private agencies arose engaging in a host of
specialized activities in economic statistics, each serving the particular
interests of its consumers. The long history of statistical activity, together
with its competitive nature, provided the experience and pragmatic
testing that in turn promoted improvements in technical procedures and
competence.
A critical feature of the American statistical system, as it has evolved,
is the multiplicity of statistical sources. While the government plays an
important role in collecting and disseminating statistics, there is no
sustained unity of interest among the governing because of the nature of
the political system:federalism, representative government, govern-
mental checks and balances, and the two-party system. No sanctity
attaches to the official statistics of the moment; they arc subject to
challenge and are coniinually challenged by both ins and outs; they are
subject to revision and are frequently revised. There are not only these
internal checks, but also the external checks of private statistical organiza-
tions and researchers, pursuing their own work as they see it.
Similar conditions prevail in other Western countries in varying
degrees. At bottom, representative government, competitive scholarship,
and free public discourse are the Western institutions that have counter-
acted error and misrepresentation in statistics, imperfectly to be sure but
at least to an important extent.3
'TheSoviet image of Western statistics is rather different:"It is said that under
capitalism comprehensive and truthful economic statistics are not to be expected because
of the secretiveness of private firms, the lack of centralized coordination in and authority
over the generation and collection of data, the class interests of the governments in power
and the mendacity of their statisticians, etc." (Grossman, Soviet Statistics, p. 22). Some of
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The importance of these institutions is shown by the generally un-
satisfactory nature of the statistics gathered and issued during wartime,
when public discussion is curbed and large segments of the economy are
centrally directed. Devons, in his informative little book on the British
experiences of aircraft planning in World War II, concluded his chapter
on the role of statistics in planning by saying
The pseudo-scientific atmosphere which the use of charts and
statistics created gave great power to the statisticians.For it was
fairly easy by the manipulation of statistics and charts to a
particular case; and the statisticians soon came to realize that many
of the officials not used to handling figures were both impressed by this
manipulative power and incapable of acquiring it themselves. The
department or directorate which had a skilled statistician always had
a great initial advantage in any inter-departmental or inter-directorate
dispute. And any statistician who was concerned with issues of policy
was bound to find himself; sooner or later, selecting and manipulating
statistics in such a way as to guide policy along the lines which he had
decided, on quite general grounds, were the right ones.
Attempts were made to avoid this danger, by separating the collection
and issue of statistics from decisions and discussions of policy. But such
attempts invariably failed in M.A.P. [the Ministry of Aircraft Produc-
tion].First, because the analysis of data about the past is so intimately
concerned with the planning of the future, that any attempt to separate
the two functions usually resulted either in the planners paying little
attention to the past and so making the most unrealistic plans, or in the
planners setting up their own fact-finding staff which by-passed the
statistical division and so deprived it of any influence. Secondly, life in
a statistics division which was separated from policy was apt to be
dull, and there was great difficulty in attracting efficient staff to such
a division.In any case, unless the staff of the statistics division were
closely concerned with policy decisions, they had no easy means of
knowing which were the most significant statistics to collect and
analyze; and they had the greatest difficulty in ensuring that some
notice was taken of the results of their analyses. The danger that the
planners who have a monopoly of the statistics might distort the figures
the real shortcomings of American government statistics are discussed in Geoffrey H.
Moore, "Accuracy of Government Statistics," Harvard Business Review, Spring 1947,
pp. 306—317.
Devons, Planning in Practice, pp. 163 f.
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to prove their case cannot be avoided. Where planning is necessary,
great power must inevitably fall into the hands of the statisticians.
These words might well have been written about the Soviet statistical
system. The troubles with Soviet statistics stem, in the first instance,
from the system of centralized authoritarian planning—from the nature
of what Grossman, following others, has called the "command economy."
Statistics are collected, processed, and issued by only one agency: the
state. There are no independent sources to restrain each other or to be
used as checks on each other, except to the extent that related figures
published by different state agencies might not be fully coordinated
before issuance. From the nature of the planning system, everybody
seems to have a stake in the figures—those who report them as well as
those who process and use them—since performance is judged by them.
One finds in the Soviet responses to difficulties the same dilemmas
pictured by Devons under less trying circumstances:statistical and
planning agencies are separated, united, and then separated again;
internal checks are evolved through a dual reporting system with the
administrative and statistical hierarchies supposedly cross-checking each
other, later to be abandoned in favor of consolidated reporting through
the statistical hierarchy alone; and so on. As Grossman has emphasized
one must not exaggerate the specifically Russian or communist
elements in these problems.Rather, given the way human beings
react in the face of authority and in their quest for material well-being,
the problems discussed here arise by and large from the logic of a
command economy and a sellers' market. To be sure, many of the
details, aspects, and nuances are peculiar to the Soviet scene, and
some perhaps even to the Russian "national character," if there be
such a thing.But the broader outlines of these problems can be
easily recognized in other authoritarian organizations, especially in
other command economies, and in sellers' markets in other countries
and at other times.
There is, at the same time, a second set of difficulties with Soviet
statistics that originates in circumstances rather specific to communism
and the Russian case.The Soviet system embodies an international
crusade, and statistics are grist for the propaganda mill. Knowing the
ideological views of Soviet leaders, one finds it hard to picture them
Grossman, Soviet Statistics, pp.4f.
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dispensing facts in a passive and detached manner. The official doctrinal
concept of statistics as a discipline is considerably at variance with the
traditional Western view, statistics being considered "a social science, the
theoretical base of which is formed by historical materialism and Marxist-
Leninist political economy."6
Another set of quite different endemic difficulties, especially in the
formative period of Soviet statistics, may be traced to the meager heritage
from the Tsarist era of experience and competence in statistical work.
The staff conducting statistical work in agencies of the central Tsarist
government was notoriously inefficient, and censuses were infrequent and
narrow in scope—the first complete population census was taken in 1897.
Industrial statistics were largely the by-product of the factory inspection
and tax collection systems. Though private trade associations engaged
in some statistical activities, they were limited in scope and came into
existence late in the nineteenth century, when industrialization first
surged forward in Russia.Statistical investigations of high quality were
conducted throughout the last four decades of the nineteenth century by
professionals working (voluntarily, for the most part) with the zemsiva, or
local and provincial councils; and out of this activity there emerged a
nucleus of well-qualified statisticians, particularly in agriculture. But the
range of activities and the number of people involved were small. Coupled
with this was the crucial fact that educational levels were low in the bulk
of the population, around 60 per cent being illiterate in 1914 and most of
the rest not far above the threshold.7 These factors must have had an
adverse effect on the quality of statistics at least in the earlier Soviet
years, despite the rapidity with which statistical activities grew and
illiteracy declined.
Counteracting these detrimental features has been the urgent internal
need for reliable statistics to run the economy. In the Soviet economic
system, statistics form the basis for making plans, checking on their
fulfillment, allocating resources, making technical managerial decisions,
assessing performance, and dispensing rewards and punishments—in
GA.Yezhov [Ezhov], "Soviet Statistics .in the Last Forty Years," Problems of Economics
(authorized English translation of Voprosy ekonomiki), May 1958, p. 34.For further
citations, see Grossman, Soviet Statistics, p. 23.
The information on statistics is from Bernard Pares, A History of Russia, rev. ed.,
New York, 1944, pp. 402 if; and A. Yezhov [Ezhov], Soviet Statistics (translated from the
Russian), Moscow, 1957, pp. 5 if. As to illiteracy, the census of 1897 listed 79 per cent of
the population as illiterate, varying from 20 per cent in the Baltic provinces to 94 per
cent in Central Asia. This had apparently fallen to just under 60 per cent by 1914.
See M. T. Florinsky, A History and an Interpretation, New York, 1953, Volume II,
pp. 1256 f; G. Vernadsky, A History of Russia, New Haven, 1951, p. 398; and S. Harcave,
Russia: A History, 3rd ed., Philadelphia, 1956, pp. 313 if.
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short, for performing virtually every economic function. The pressure
for trustworthy statistics comes, so to speak, from the top downward:
every agency in the political and administrative hierarchy strives to get
truthful reports from subordinate units.
Centralized authoritarian direction of the economy thus generates forces
with opposing effects on the reliability of statistics.On the one side,
there is a pressure for misreporting moving from the bottom upward:
self-interest motivates each subordinate unit to try to mislead its superior,
the central government finally being motivated to mislead the outside
world. On the other side, there is a pressure for accuracy moving from the
top downward, similarly motivated by self-interest. Which force gains
the upper hand?
The answer is misreporting, since it does occur—as we shall see—even
though it is certainly restricted by the pressure for accuracy. But before
moving to the evidence, we may conclude these general remarks by noting
the concern of Soviet officials themselves over the question of reliability
of statistics.In the words of Grossman once more .8
Evena cursory reading of the Soviet literature reveals that the
central statistical authorities have been well aware of the imperfect
reliability of the data submitted to them. A closer study leaves no
doubt that they have been gravely concerned over the problem, and
that the question of accuracy of physical output data occupies the very
center of this concern. It is also clear that the main source of inaccuracy
is believed to be distortion of reported data by interested parties, aided
by the negligence, if not abetted by the connivance, of the lower
statistical agencies.
The basis of this concern will emerge from the details of the statistical
system and the statistics themselves.
The Statistical System: A Brief Summary9
During early Soviet years the statistical apparatus, called the Central
Statistical Administration (Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravienie, abbreviated
TsSU), had an independent status, containing within it a special agency,
the Division of Census and Statistics of the Supreme Council of the
Economy sovet narodnogo khoziaistva, abbreviated VSNKIZ), con-
cerned primarily with large-scale state industry.With the advent of
8Grossman,Soviet Statistics, p.49.
This section is a condensation of ibid., Part' One.
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centralized planning, dissatisfaction arose over the separation of planning
and statistical agencies, and in 1930 TsSU was made a part of the State
Planning Commission (Gosplan). The name of the statistical arm was
soon changed, in line with its new status, to the lengthy title Central
Administration of Economic Record-Keeping Attached to the Gosplan of
the USSR (Tsentral'noe upravienie narodnokhoziaistvennogo ucheta pri Gosplane
SSSR, abbreviated TsUNKhU). The merger of the central agencies was
strengthened in 1938,10 after a series of purges associated with the ill-fated
population census of 1937, and it was extended to subordinate units late
in 1943. The unified structure continued until 1948, when the statistical
organization, which had been renamed TsSUin 1941, was separated from
the Gosplan at all levels.It has retained its independent position up to the
present.
During its affiliation with the Gosplan, the statistical organization was
developed into a hierarchical structure on a regional basis. A chain of
subordination became established with the central administration at the
top, followed by administrations at the level of the republic, territory
(krai), province (oblast'), major city, district (raion), and lesser city."
This hierarchy has remained in force, apparently being unaffected by the
economic and administrative reorganization of 1957, which will be com-
mented on briefly below.
The basic simplicity of this statistical organization belies the complex
system of reporting that existed until the reforms of 1957. Data originat-
ing in economic enterprises flowed upward through two parallel channels:
on the one side, the statistical hierarchy already described and, on the
other side, the economic-administrative hierarchy (see Chart l).12 The
system also provided for cross-reporting and for simultaneous reporting
at different levels in the hierarchy. Thus, the enterprise reported in three
directions at once: to the local statistical unit, to the next higher statistical
unit (at the provincial level if existent, otherwise at the republic level),
and to its immediate superior in the economic-administrative hierarchy,
typically a chief administration (glavk). The chief administration in turn
submitted a consolidated report to both its ministry and the central
statistical office, and the ministry did the same to the central
office.Finally, the statistical offices at every level submitted separate
10Inthis connection, the name was altered to read "of the Gosplan" from "attached to
the Gosplan."
11Fora short period, these were also subdistrict inspectorates. The "chain of command"
given here is simplified. For example, the so-called autonomous republics are subordinate
to the union republics to which they are assigned. Major Cities are the capital Cities of
union republics, plus Leningrad.
12Thischart is also simplified. See the cited source.
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consolidated reports to the corresponding level of the Communist Party,
the government, and the planning organization—a
our chart.
flow not shown in
This complex system could have arisen for a number of reasons, not the
least being the desire of every agency to have the most up-to-date figures
at its disposal.Whatever its origins, the system aboundedin possible
CHART I





Arrows indicate direction of reporting.
* For republics without provinces, reports were made directly to the republic; otherwise, to the province.
Source: Adapted from Grossman, Soviet Statistics, p. 37
system did much more than multiply paperwork. The main obstacle to
places:theministerial,
cross checks. Sums could be checked at almost every level in five different
statistical, Party,
the many opportunities
organizations. The only figures whose accuracy was not subject to direct
checking were the basic data reported by the enterprise itself.Despite
government, and planning
for checkingfigures,itis doubtfulthat the
effective auditing is the enormous volume of data that must be rapidly
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processed by the Soviet statistical system.Given this fact—discussed
more fully below—and the strong incentives to misreport, the interlacing
of agencies in the statistical network may have worked in the opposite
direction, aiding cooperative misreporting.
The system of parallel reporting was abandoned with the reforms of
1957, occasioned by the administrative reorganization of industry into
regional economic councils (sovnarkhozy). The details of the new reporting
system need not detain us, since it does not generally apply to the period of
this study.'3 We may merely note that the upward flow of data to the
central government now seems to proceed solely through the statistical
apparatus. In line with this change, Starovskii, head of TsSU, remarked
that "whereas up to now the checking of accounting data has been done
by the respective subdivisions of chief administrations and ministries, now
this most responsible work will be entirely entrusted to TsSU agencies."14
In a more lengthy comment, Starovskii says :15
Inaddition to the state statistical agencies, to which enterprises
reported data (on state accounting forms), ministries, departments, and
their chief administrations required a tremendous number of different
tables, questionnaires, and estimates.Parallel accounts were also sent
to financial and banking agencies and to a number of local organiza-
tions, and often so-called "wild" accounts (i.e., those not prescribed by
law) were compiled. One of the managers of the former Ministry of
Heavy Machine Building considered it essential to have, for example,
data on the height at which electric light bulbs were hung in factories
and other such information without which he thought it was impossible
to administer from the center the enterprises under his jurisdiction.
The administrative reorganization of industry and construction
enables us to eliminate existing defects. Now the receipt and processing
of accounting statistics for these branches of the national economy is
centralized in the state statistical agencies.Industrial enterprises,
construction works, and economic organizations present their accounts
to the appropriate province, territory, or republic statistical agencies.
Further processing of statistical data is done by agencies of the USSR
Central Statistical Administration.Beginning with the accounts for
June 1957, the regional economic councils, the Party and Soviet
administrative agencies, and the planning committees will receive the
'3Forthe details, see Grossman, Soviet Statistics, pp. 38 if.
V. Starovskii, "Novye zadachi sovetskoi statistiki" [New Tasks for Soviet Statistics],
Komrnunist [The Communist], 1957, No. 14, p. 70.
"Ibid., pp. 62 f.
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statistical material they need directly from the local agencies of the
Central Statistical Administration. Within TsSU the summary accounts
will come not from the ministries but from the local agencies of TsSU
and TsSU will process them and present them to the USSR govern-
ment, the Gosplan, and other central organizations .
Thesize of the statistical apparatus is indicated by Soviet estimates
that nearly two and a half million persons are employed directly in
keeping and processing records.16 Reporting is done on a current basis.'7
All enterprises (except the very smallest producing for local markets)
must submit monthly telegraphic reports on physical output, followed by
a mailed report sent within three days of the end of the month; they must
submit comprehensive monthly and quarterly reports, covering other
economic data as well as output, within fifteen days.For products
considered particularly important (e.g., fuel, steel, electricity), additional
telegraphic reports must be submitted daily or every ten days.Each
echelon in the statistical structure must then process within ten to fifteen
days the data it receives. With such a flood of data, it is doubtful that
much could be done beyond summing and tabulating in this brief period
even if the statistical operations were fully mechanized; but only 3 to
4 per cent of those engaged in statistical work had the use of electrical
adding and computing machines as late as 1953.18
So much for the flow of data into the system. The flow out of it, in
the form of published statistics, has been less steady and voluminous. In
some respects, the high point of published industrial statistics was reached
in the late 1920's. The data, published in many sources, were compre-
hensive and detailed, and their processing was directed by competent
economists and statisticians.Concurrently with the five year plans, the
flow of published statistics gradually diminished, the low point being
16SeeGrossman, Soviet Statistics, p. 30, n. 21. According to Pravda, May 12, 1958, the
number engaged in this work was put at "about three million, of whom almost 80 per cent
are engaged in so-called primary record-keeping."For the United States, the 1950
census of occupations lists about 376,000 accountants and auditors and 721,000 book-
keepers in the employed labor force, a total of 1.1 million. Many of these are engaged in
activities not covered by the Soviet concept of record-keeping.
17Small-scaleenterprises are excepted, their output being estimated through periodic
censuses and sample surveys. Current reporting was tried during the period 1949—1954
and then abandoned. Until 1930 all enterprises, large-scale as well as small-scale, were
covered by comprehensive periodic censuses.Before the 1957 reforms, each enterprise
reported currently on more than a hundred forms, sixty to seventy of them flowing into
the centralized reporting system. Even after the reforms, centralized current reporting
was in force (in 1957) for more than 10,000 commodities. For details, see Grossman,
Soviet Statistics, p. 35, n. 15.
Most do have the abacus, a valuable computational aid.For more details on
mechanization, see ibid., pp. 55 if.
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reached after 1937 and continuing as late as 1956, when a striking improve-
ment took place. Since then, published statistics have moved toward the
coverage characteristic of the late 1920's and early l930's, but they have
not regained that stage yet.
During the First and Second Five Year Plans, published statistics came
to be concentrated almost exclusively in a set of annual statistical ab-
stracts, setting the practice for later years. The most important volumes
are those bearing the title Socialist Construction of the USSR (Sotsialisticheskoe
stroitel'stvo SSSR), the first being published in 1934 and the last in 1938.
These collections of data are roughly comparable in coverage, detail, and
amount of explanatory material with summarizing abstracts published in
Western countries.They are not comparable with Western primary
statistical sources, such as the various census publications of the United
States and the United Kingdom.
The most comprehensive of these Soviet abstract-like publications is the
volume that appeared in 1936, containing data through 1935. From this
peak, the amount of published statistical material fell off sharply. The
abstract appearing in 1938, the last of this series, covered only the period
of the Second Five Year Plan and a selective group of industries.It
was not until 1956, or eighteen years later, that a similar abstract again
appeared.
During the years intervening between 1938 and 1956, the only published
statistics were those contained in official announcements and directives,
political speeches, occasional articles in specialized journals, textbooks,
and a handful of books written by Soviet authorities and largely descriptive
or polemical in nature.Annual summaries of industrial performance
were generally presented in less than a page of the newspaper. Statistics
were limited in naturewell as amount: absolute data on output were
given out very rarely and for only a very small sample of products; data
were usually stated in relative terms, as a percentage of some base figure,
itself unknown or obscure. The cryptic information given out during this
period caused economic research in the West to take on the characteristics
of archaeology.
The appearance in 1956 of a small statistical abstract, The National
Economy of the USSR (Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR), markedly improved the
statistical picture. Even so, the volume contains only fifty to sixty pages
with basic data for industry.19 More significant additions to industrial
19Inone English translation, these pages are reduced by more than half without
materially affecting readability (Statistical Handbook of the USSR, Harry Schwartz, ed.,
New York, 1957).
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statistics were made withthepublicationof severalabstractsin
1957 and1958,the most important beingIndustryof theUSSR
(Promyshlennost' SSSR).2° This volume contains 447 pages, with about
168 presenting data on physical output.Virtually all the data on
industry in The National Economy of theUSSR (1956)are repeated
in industry of the USSR, while the latter contains many data not in the
former.
These recent Soviet abstracts may be compared withstatistical
sourcesfor the United States.The 1956 edition of the Statistical
Abstract of the United States contains some 100 pages of industrial data
in small type; the Product Supplement to the census of manufactures
for1954 contains 259 pages, twice the size of those in the Soviet
abstract, of physical output data.f we move to primary sources,
the basic volumes of the latter census contain about 3,600 pages, and
the Minerals Yearbook for any recent year is equally large, though the
pages are smaller.
The scope of the most recent Soviet statistical abstracts is perhaps better
indicated by the number of industrial products covered. Output data
are given for about 90 products in The National Economy of the USSR
(1956) and 212 in Industry of the USSR, in most cases for benchmark
years.2' The product coverage of these recent Soviet abstracts is generally
less comprehensive than that of Socialist Construction (1936), particularly
for chemicals, nonferrous metals, and minerals. In the Product Supplement
to the U.S. census of manufactures for 1947, physical output data are
given for some 6,000 products; the census for 1954 covers about the same
number.In the U.S. census of mineral industries for 1954, physical
output data are given for more than 750 products.These product
coverages are, of course, larger than for earlier years, but in every
industrial census of the United States since the turn of the century, the
count of products would run at least to many hundred—in most, to
several thousand. At the same time, it should be recognized that such
counts describe detail more than breadth of coverage. That is to say,
the products summarized in the recent Soviet abstracts would be broken
down into hundreds of subproducts in U.S. statistics.
20Fora list of recent statistical handbooks, see Soviet Studies, January 1959, pp. 312 if,
and January 1960, pp. 348 if. The volunies discussed in the text have been followed by
steadily improved handbooks, particularly by new editions of The National Economy of
the USSR appearing in 1959 and 1960.
21Forthe industries covered by Industry of the USSR, data are given for every year over
1913—1955, except 1941—1944 inclusive, in the case of 59; only for benchmark years in the
case of 76; and only for selected benchmark years in the case of 77. Benchmark years are
taken as 1913, 1928, 1932, 1937, 1940, 1945, 1950, and 1955.
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In addition to the official Soviet compendiums of statistics, there are a
number of secondary sources containing information of one sort or another
bearing on industrial output. These range from articles and monographs,
such as are found in various professional journals, to general reference
books, such as the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Bol'shaia sovelskaia entsiklopediia).
From the late 1930's to 1956, these sources contained only scattered
information on output in relative terms, as mentioned above. Occasion-
ally, an absolute figure might be given.Products were seldom defined
and references were not made to related collections of data.Such
information is useful only to fill in gaps in other data.
The dearth of statistics in secondary sources reflects the control
exercised at the center over release of information internally as well as
externally. At the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, Mikoyan
complained of the absence of large-scale statistical studies in the Soviet
Union and remarked that "unfortunately, Comrade Starovsky had these
statistical data under lock and key in the Central Statistical Administra-
tion.Economists are still deprived of the opportunity of working with
them and are condenmed to iecite and repeat old formulas, old data.
Thisisonereasonwe donotseecreativeworkfromour
economists."22 This statement, it later turned out, was a clue to the
forthcoming change in statistical policy.The volume of data has
expanded in secondary sources along with official statistical publications,
but there still seems to be little available there that is not also in primary
sources.
The statistical publications of the Soviet period generally do not
reproduce data for the Tsarist period, except for the year 1913, which is
used as a basis of comparison for later developments. The only exception
to date is the most recent abstract, Industry of the USSR, which contains
prerevolutionary output series for eight industries.Most data for the
Tsarist period must be drawn from the statistical sources of those times.
These sources have important shortcomings, primarily traceable to their
limited coverage and to the circumstances under which the data were
collected (mainly as a by-product of the factory inspection system and
as an aid in the administration of taxes). However, there is no indication
of widespread distortion or suppression of statistics, either by those provid-
ing the primary entries or by those processing the data. The data for the
Tsarist period are deficient mainly by virtue of errors, omissions, and
poor coverage.
22CurrentDigest of the Soviet Press, VIII, 8, p. 10 (original text in Pravda and Izvestia,
February 18, 1956).
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Evidence on Reliability of Data23
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Reliability in a statistical context generally means the accuracy with
which quantitative magnitudes measure the things they are purported
to measure. Put another way, a statistic is reliable if it is an accurate
magnitude for a definite thing.Inaccuracy or ambiguity may be the
result of distortion, or fabrication, and, needless to say, the distinc-
tion between ambiguity and inaccuracy fades at the margins. As an
example, consider a magnitude given as the output of coal. Even if the
output is measured as accurately as possible, it cannot be adjudged a
reliable datum unless we know how the term "coal" is being used.
Ambiguity is a general characteristic of Soviet output data, increasing
in degree as the data become more aggregative. At one extreme stands
the official Soviet index of industrial production.This index is the
result of a set of actual calculations on actual data; but we have only a
rough notion of the data and calculations, and hence cannot reproduce
the index or fully understand its meaning. Enough is known, however, to
be able to say, as almost all Western scholars do, that the index does not
represent any of the concepts of aggregate production utilized in Western
statistics, though it goes by the same name.
The disparity in these statistical constructs may be shown by tracing
23Thereis an extensive Western literature on this subject, and the discussion here
draws much from it.The following is a partial list of specialized monographs and
articles: Abram Bergson, "A Problem in Soviet Statistics," Review of Economic Statistics,
November 1947, 234-242;idem, "Reliability and Usability of Soviet Statistics," The
American Statistician, June—July 1953, 13—16; Cohn Clark, A Critique of Russian Statistics,
London, 1939; Maurice Dobb, "Further Appraisals of Russian Economic Statistics—
A Comment on Soviet Statistics," Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1948, 34—38;
Alexander Gerschenkron, "The Soviet Indices of Industrial Production," Review of
Economic Statistics, November 1947, 217—226; idem, "Comment on Naum Jasny's 'Soviet
Statistics,' "Reviewof Economics and Statistics, August 1950, 250—251; idem, "Reliability
of Soviet Industrial and National Income Statistics," The American Statistician, June—July
1953,1 8—2 1; Gregory Grossman, Soviet Statistics; Naum Jasny, "Intricacies of Russian
National Income Statistics," Journal of Political Economy, August 1947, 299—322; idem,
"Soviet Statistics," Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1950, 92—99; idem, "Inter-
national Organizations and Soviet Statistics," Journal of the American Statistical Association,
March 1950, 48—64;idem, The Soviet 1956 Statistical Handbook: A Commentary, East
Lansing, 1957; Stuart A. Rice, "Statistical Concepts in the Soviet Union Examined from
Generally Accepted Scientific Viewpoints," Review of Economic Statistics, February 1952,
82—86; idem, "Statistics in the Soviet Union," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1952,
159—162; Harry Schwartz, "On the Use of Soviet Statistics," Journal of the American
Statistical Association, September 1947, 401—406; idem, "The Organization and Operation
of the Soviet Statistical Apparatus," The American Statistician, April—May 1952, 9—13;
V. Tsonev, "Falsification of Soviet Industrial Statistics" (unpublished manuscript),
Research Program on the USSR, New York, 1953; and Lynn Turgeon, "On the Relia-
bility of Soviet Statistics," Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1952, 75—76.
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through the consequences of accepting the Soviet index at face value.
According to the official Soviet index, industrial production multiplied
27 times •between 1913 and 1955.Over the same period, industrial
production in the United States multiplied 4.7 times, according to a
standard Western-type index (see Table 61).If these indexes were both
taken to measure the same kind of growth, one would conclude that
Soviet industrial production had grown almost six times as much as
American production. This would imply in turn that Soviet industrial
production in 1955 was about 80 per cent of the American level, since in
1913 it was about 14 per cent.In fact, Soviet production in 1955 was,
by our calculations, only about 23 per cent of the American level (see
Table 63) and, by recent Soviet pronouncements, 36 per cent.24 One
concludes that the Soviet index of industrial production exaggerates
growth as that concept is typically measured in the West.
Every industry is a mixture of heterogeneous elements to some degree,
and what we call "physical output" is an index number in miniature,
even for the more narrowly defined industries. Ambiguity is dispelled
only to the extent that product coverage and aggregating methods are
described in detail. As we have already noted, Soviet statistical sources
are lax, in this regard, and the data one must work with are correspond-
ingly ambiguous.
On the other side, the numerical accuracy of many Soviet output data
also comes under question, no matter how the industries to which they
Until recently, Soviet statisticians had not fallen into inconsistencies on this score.
As late as 1957, a Soviet statistical source (Ia. loffe, ed., Strany sotsializnza i kapitalizma v
tsifrakh [Socialist and Capitalist Countries in Figures], Moscow, 1957, p. 8) gave the
fractions as 6.8 per cent for 1913 and 47.6 per cent for 1955. Similar fractions for 1913
are given in Ekonomika sotsialistiches/cikh promyshlennykh predpriiatii [Economics of Socialist
Industrial Enterprises], Moscow, 1956, p. 7; Ekonomika promyshlennosti SSSR [Economics
of Industry of the USSR], Moscow, 1956, p. 21; and Spravochnik komsoinol'skogo propa-
gandisla i agitatora [Reference Book for the Young Communist Propagandist and Agitator],
Moscow, 1957, p. 126. These figures, though wrong, are at least consistent with com-
parative growth of the official Soviet index and the American index in Soviet
sources.For an intriguing sketch of the gyrations followed to preserve such internal
consistency, see A. Nove," '1926/7' and All That," Soviet Studies, October 1957, pp. 127 if.
Recently, the picture has changed completely, and the fractions of output claimed are
no longer consistent with the official Soviet index. Briefly stated, the latest Soviet position,
announced in 1959 by no less an authority than Khrushchev, is that output was 12.5
per cent of the American level in 1913 and 50 per cent in 1958 ( Vestnikstatistiki [Statistical
Bulletin], 1959, No. 11, pp. 17 if). These fractions would imply that Soviet industrial
production multiplied 18 times over 1913—1958, not 36 times as shown by the official
index. The official claim is thus cut in half at one blow, and it still remains much too
large, as we shall see.
Incidentally, the last-mentioned source states that the figure of 7 per cent for 1913 was
never given official recognition, merely being an estimate of private Soviet economists.
This is contrary to fact, as may be seen by examining the sources cited above.
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applyaredefined.These inaccuraciesresultinthe main from
misreporting—mostly overreporting—generated within thestatistical
system.
It is difficult for an outsider to appraise the reliability of Soviet statistics,
since he must rely almost entirely on reports of émigrés25 or on internal
evidence, in the manner of the historian. With minor exceptions, public
discussion of statistics is not allowed within the Soviet Union: they must
be accepted without open question. And, since the government has a
monopoly of statistics, it is not possible to check independently derived
and published figures against each other.
In the discussion that follows, we shall consider, first, elements in the
statistical system that promote distortion at various levels;second,
examples of published statistical information that must be considered
unreliable, by virtue of either distortion or ambiguity; and, third, the
inferences about reliability that can be drawn from internal evidence
presented by the statistics themselves.The discussion will be only
suggestive, for, as Grossman remarks, "It would be futile to attempt to
list all the pitfalls in the interpretation of Soviet statistics, even of only
the industrial physical output data.In the final analysis each figure
must be tested separately and on its own ground for possible descriptive
distortion, always bearing in mind what itisthat the statistics are
'trying to prove.' "26
MISREPORTING
Misreporting starts with the enterprise itself. The incentive reaches down
to the worker and up to the manager. The worker's incentive derives,
in the first place, from the piece-rate system of pay, which applies to
almost every job where activity can be measured in physical units. As
early as 1928, piece rates applied to more than half the hours worked by
all persons engaged (excluding plant managers and superior echelons) in
large-scale industry; the percentage rose to 70 by 1935. A comparable
statistic is not available for later years, but in 1955 more than three-
quarters of persons engaged in all industry were paid on a piece-rate
basis. Piece rates tend to be progressive: the higher the output, the larger
the pay per piece. In addition, special premiums are paid to some workers
for economical use of inputs and other savings in unit costs, and non-
pecuniary perquisites—such as vacations, better housing, and preferential
25Themost comprehensive summary and thorough analysis of émigrës' views on this
subject is contained in Joseph Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR, Cambridge,
Mass., 1957.
26Grossman,Soviet Statistics, pp. 117 f.
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rations of other types, where rationing is in force—accrue to workers
with superior output records.Foremen and other overseers receive
similar rewards, based on the performance of those under their super-
vision.27These factorsall motivate the worker toexaggerate his
output.
Overreporting by workers seems to be widespread.28 Much of it
applies to intermediate activities rather than to the final output of an
enterprise, but this may indirectly force management to overreport final
output to make it consistent with inflated wage costs. Direct overreport-
ing of final output generally requires the cooperation of management and
the independent inspectors. Since there is no conflict of interest between
worker and management in this matter, such cooperation may be forth-
coming wherever detection is difficult, as in the case of output measured
in bulk. Moreover, the pervasive piece-rate system apparently extends
in some instances to those who record final output. Thus, one example is
known of a clerk whose job was weighing and recording the output of
coal and who was paid a piece rate for the amount of coal recorded.29
This case is perhaps extreme, but one can imagine similar jobs where a
worker would be in a position to inflate finished output and where it
would be in his interests to do so.
Management's incentive to inflate output derives from the fact that
the system of rewards and penalties is geared primarily to its success in
meeting or overfulfihling its output quotas. Other goals (such as planned
profits) are important, but the manager receives special benefits and
privileges to the extent that he accomplishes the output targets set for
him—and special penalties to the extent that he fails to do so.3°His
foremost concern is, therefore, with the recorded output, and one would
expect the representative manager to be tempted to improve on the
actual record by one means or another. This incentive is strengthened
by the fact that other indexes by which his performance is judged are
improved step by step with the output record. The manager may react
by writing up output or skimping on quality, a matter discussed in more
detail in the next chapter.
One consequence is a tendency for the product mix to get arranged so
27Thisparagraph is based on ibid., pp. 59 if.
28See,e.g., Berliner, Factory and Manager, pp. 172 if.
Grossman,Soviet Statistics, p. 63.
See Berliner, Factory and Manager, Chapter III; and A. Nove, "The Problem of
Success Indicators in Soviet Industry," Economica, February 1958, 1—13. For a description
of similar conditions in Hungary, see Bela Balassa, The Hungarian Experience in Economic
Planning, New Haven, 1959, pp. 132 if.
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that it reflects the highest possible output in terms of the units of measure
designated in the planned goal. Alec Nove Cites a classic, if apocryphal,
example of a nail factory:3'
When the plan was established in numbers, only small nails were
made; so the basis of the plan was changed to weight, and then there
were only large nails.If the plan is expressed in money, then only those
which are cheapest to make will be produced, and probably all of the
same size;if each type of nail is to be separately specified in the plan,
this would be a glaring case of bureaucratic over-centralization.If
the price of nails reflected supply-and-demand conditions, of course,
things would be different;but this verges on heresy.Meanwhile,
there are repeated appeals to the managers to provide a proper
assortment of products.
A number of similar examples are documented by Grossman,32 and
need not be repeated here. The point to be made is that a shift in the
unit of measure or an expansion in the coverage of a product category
provides an opportunity for the skillful manager to "create" additional
output without productive effort, merely by adjusting the product mix.
This can be done only over a relatively short period of time, but the
fictitious increase in output can occur each time there is a change-over
in unit of measure or an expansion in coverage. When output series in
different physical units are spliced together—as in the case of flat glass,
leather, linen fabrics, and so on—the result may be a substantial exaggera-
tion of the growth in output.
Where such opportunities as these are not present, the manager may
resort to simulation. The techniques of simulation are too varied and
complex to discuss at length here.33It should be noted, however, that
devices have been found for "losing" simulated output in inventory and
for "passing it on" to customers. While the economic system abounds with
seeming built-in checks, these do not prevent widespread misreporting.
Officials within an enterprise who are liable for inaccurate records—the
31A.Nove, "The Pace of Soviet Economic Development," Lloyds Bank Review, April
1956, p. 10.
Grossman, Soviet Statistics, pp. 73 if.For the situation in Hungary, see Balassa,
The Hungarian Experience, pp. 140 if.
On them, see Berliner, Factory and Manager, Chapters VIII—X; and Grossman, Soviet
Statistics, pp. 65 if. Grossman comments (p. 66, n. 23): "Although Berliner's data refer
primarily to the thirties, there seems to have been little fundamental change in this
regard." This seems to be confirmed by Hungarian experience as related by Balassa
(The Hungarian Experience, pp. 140 if).
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chief accountant, the head of the planning department, and so on—
seem to be dominated by the plant manager and enmeshed in a "web of
mutual involvement," to use Berliner's expressive phrase.34 Measuring,
counting, and weighing devices tend to be primitive and sparse. Freight
is generally not weighed independently by the shipping agent, and
sample surveys indicate that it is significantly overreported in weight.35
Although quality inspection is conducted by an independent organiza-
tion, its general ineffectiveness is attested to by Soviet authorities.For
somewhat different reasons, the transportation system may aid in writing
up shipments:its performance is assessed by the volume of traffic it
handles.Finally, in the prevailing "sellers' market" customers refrain
from complaining about shortages or defective goods, since they are
often happy to get anything at all—in any event, they generally prefer
not to incur the disfavor of suppliers.36
The widespread practice of overreporting may seem strange for a state
as authoritarian as the Soviet Union.Grossman gives the following
explanation
It would seem at first glance that the multiplicity of controlling and
auditing agencies ..., theseverity of the punitive measures at their
disposal, and the thoroughness of the police system would successfully
thwart the commission of such "economic crimes" as the falsification
of output data and related illegal acts. Yet even the least acquaintance
with Soviet reality leads one to the conclusion that "economic crimes"
are extremely prevalent and to the conjecture that for each case that
reaches the daylight of publicity there must be many that never do.
An important factor is, of course, the inherent advantage that any
insider has in concealing irregularities from the outside auditor's
view—what in its more extreme form might be called Pooh-Bah's
Berliner describes the basis for this involvement as follows (Factory and Manager,
pp. 324 f): "Awareness of common interests in plan fulfillment often generates within
the enterprise a 'family relationship' in which Party secretary, chief accountant, and
other control officials facilitate or overlook the transgressions of an enterprising and
successful director and share in the rewards and prestige that come with plan fulfillment.
It is the fact that the control officials perceive their own fates as closely interwoven with
the success of the enterprise that explains the endurance of the irregular practices of
management."
See Ernest Williams, Freight Transportation in the Soviet Union: A Comparison with the
United States, Occasional Paper 65, New York, NBER, 1959, pp. 11—13; and also Gross-
man, Soviet Statistics, pp. 98 f.
Foran extensive discussion of these checks and the ways they are thwarted, see ibid.,
pp. 84 if. An example of the willingness of low-priority consumers to accept defective
sheet metal is given in Current Digest, IX, 48, p. 25.
Grossman, Soviet Statistics, p. 91.
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Law38—aided by the complexities of the very paper work that is
intended to entrap the culprit, and abetted by the inspector's corrupti-
bility and his reluctance to stir up a possible hornet's nest.
From this discussion one would gather that the possibilities of simulation
diminish, the more closely the product in question is related to areas of
high priority and the more precisely it can be measured. Thus, it is
doubtful that significant distortion of output occurs in enterprises closely
related to defense industries. By the same line of reasoning, one may
suppose that the worst examples occur in enterprises producing consumer
goods, for checks will be weakest here.
This brief survey of statistical misreporting at the enterprise level may
be concluded by noting that underreporting also exists, though not as
prevalently as overreporting.The most important cause of under-
reporting is pilferage or other unauthorized use of products.39This
phenometion is, however, not unique to the Soviet Union: output is
understated in every country to the extent that there is pilferage. More-
over, it is not clear that pilferage will always cause underreporting. If it
takes place before output is recorded, then output will be understated
on this score, On the other hand, if it takes place after output is recorded
—if, for instance, finished goods are taken out of inventory—then under-
reporting is not only more difficult but also less necessary. The effect here
is, from an accounting point of view, the same as would be caused by
overreporting of output;that is to say, fewer goods are available for
shipment or for storage in inventory than are entered in the production
record.If an enterprise can "lose" unproduced goods in its inventory
accounts, it can also "lose" produced but stolen ones.
As one moves beyond the enterprise, less and less is known about
possible distortions in statistics.Officials in the processing system are
more closely related to the top Soviet leadership than are plant managers,
and one would suppose that their activities would be less subject to
extensive public criticism.It will be recalled that the processing system
has had a dual structure. Each ministry in the economic-administrative
organization would seem to have an incentive to inflate the output data
reported to it, in order to make its performance look better than it
actually is.During the period when the statistical organization was
subordinate to the .Gosplan, a similar incentive operated in that side of
the structure.Finally, officials at various territorial levels in both the
38" .
-asPaymaster-General, I could so cook the accounts that, as Lord High
Auditor, I should never discover the fraud" (footnote in original). "Forother causes, see ibid., pp. 78 if.
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economic-administrative and (more significantly) the Communist Party
organizations are interested in "improving" statistics for their regions.
Although independent tampering with statistics by only one interested
party would be risky,40 cooperative ventures offer more opportunity for
success. One can imagine suitable occasions for such activity, but its
prevalence and importance are anybody's guess. The few discussions of
this matter to be found in the Soviet literature are essentially exhortations
to statisticians to be honest and to resist whatever pressures there might
be to get involved in "monkeying" with the figures. Speaking in 1955,
Starovskii emphasized that the statistical organization was independent
of local political authorities, but went on to say that "independence.
means only that no local organization may force a worker in a [local]
statistical administration or in a district or city inspectorate to change a
figure if that figure is correct."4' In 1956, a newspaper article appeared
accusing the Central Statistical Administration of collaborating with
political authorities in "adjusting" milk production upward by varying
percentages in different provinces.42 Such accusations are very rare, but
they seem to testify that joint distortion is at least feasible.43
40B.P. Martschenko, an émigré Soviet economist, gives an example from personal
experience in which he was able to verify that 1939 population data from Ukrainian
provinces (oblasti) were faithfully reproduced in. a compilation issued for internal use by
the Ukrainian Statistical Administration, despite the fact that these data showed large
deficits in population as a result of collectivization of agriculture. He goes on to say (as
quoted in Grossman, Soviet Statistics, p. 114): "It must also be noted that the falsification
of census data in the course of their processing in the oblast' statistical administrations
would have been too unwieldy an operation, which would have inevitably become known
to many persons in the statistical administrations, and could not have been concealed."
These comments are certainly relevant to the matters at issue, but it must be kept in mind
that Martschenko's example is drawn from the field of demography, where the pressures
for internal distortion may not be as strong as in the case of industrial output. The
pressures are, nonetheless, there, as may be seen from the sweeping purge of statistical
personnel after the population census of 1937 produced findings distasteful to the Soviet
leadership (see ibid., p. 17).
41Vestnikstatistiki, 1955, No. 1, p. 82, as quoted in Grossman, Soviet Statistics, p. 103.
42V.Surkov, "Counting on 'Incomplete Accounts,' "CurrentDigest, VIII, 14, pp. 37 f
(original text in Izvestia, April 6, 1956). During my visit to Moscow in the summer of
1956, I submitted a written inquiry to the Central Statistical Administration about
articles on inaccurate reporting of data and received the following reply:
"If you are referring to the article published in Izvestia on April 6, 1956 (we do not
know of any other articles), the author, obviously not sufficiently informed, expressed
the opinion that the Central Statistical Administration determined the milk yield on
collective farms incorrectly and made corrections for omissions in collective farm
accounting. These omissions lay in not including milk from cows attached to the children's
institutions on collective farms or milk used to feed shoats on pig farms.
"In regions with a surplus beef production, the milk consumed on the farm is not
included in the records. The milk fed to lambs, the milk consumed by the milkmaids, by
the people who transport the milk to dairies, and by the collective farmers in whose
quarters the cows are temporarily kept—all this milk is often not recorded.
"The USSR Central Statistical Administration has corrected all the collective farm
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When we move to the publishing of statistics, we enter a rather
different universe. The motive for misreporting at this level is perhaps
more properly viewed as political and propagandist than as personal.
The veil of secrecy surrounding the activities of the top Soviet leader-
ship, enforced by a rigorous security apparatus, makes it impossible to
know what happens to data between final compilation and publication.
In particular, there is no way of knowing conclusively whether Soviet
authorities keep two sets of books: one containing statistics for internal
use only, the other for dissemination to the outside world. However,
most Western specialists have concluded, for a variety of reasons, that
dual accounts do not exist, in this narrow sense.44
The most direct evidence on the question of dual accounts is provided
by a statistical annex to the 1941 Plan45 that was captured during World
War II by the Germans and later recaptured by the Americans. This
document is labeled "not for publication," and it therefore presumably
represents a compilation of data intended for internal use only. When the
planned goals inthis document are compared with those publicly
announced in 1941, no significant discrepancies are found.46 Although
this conclusion applies directly to planned goals for 1941, it should be
noted that they are significantly higher in general than published outputs
for 1940 (see Tables 1 and
accounting on milk up to 1955. This adjustment amounted to 0.7 per cent of the total
milk production in the USSR. Unlike in the U.S.A. and other countries, in the USSR
these adjustments are made every year on the basis of a special check.
"At present, the CSA is conducting a routine investigation of the milk yield on collective
farms, after which the question of making adjustments on the future data on milk will be
discussed.
"The production of grain, meat and other agricultural products is recorded without
adjustments."
A similar case involving adjustment of agricultural data was reported by P. Polynsky,
"Why are Frauds Shielded in Chernovtsky ?"CurrentDigest, IX, 42, pp. 20 f (original
text in Sel'skoe khoziaistvo, September 12, 1957).
An interesting example of collaboration in statistical misrepresentation, involving
officials from the plant level up to Commissar Kaganovich, is recited from personal
experience by Victor Kravchenko in IChose Freedom, New York, 1952, pp. 298 if.Similar
cases have been reported in Hungary (see Balassa, The Hungarian Experience, pp. 145
and 148). "SeeGrossman, Soviet Statistics, pp. 106 if.
Gosudarstvennyi plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1941 god [The State Plan
for the Development of the USSR National Economy for 1941], Moscow, 1941 (reprinted
by the American Council of Learned Societies, 1948).
46SeeLynn Turgeon, "On the Reliability of Soviet Statistics," Review of Econotnics and
Statistics, February 1952, 75—76.
The 1941 Plan seems to have been ambitious, particularly in view of the fact that
World War II was in progress elsewhere in Europe, and this supports other evidence
that the Soviet Union probably did not expect to get involved in the war (see Chapter 8).
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TABLE 1
OUTPUT FOR 1940 ANDPLANNEDOUTPUT FOR 1941:








Pig iron th.m.t. 14,900 18,000 121
Rolled steel th.m.t. 13,110 15,830b 121
Steel ingots and castings th.m.t. 18,320 22,450b 123
Quality steel th.m.t. 3,196 3,914 123
Steel sheets (exci. pickled iron)th.m.t. 1,786 1,752 98
Steelsheets (mc!. pickled iron)th.m.t. 1,822 1,827 100
Steel wire rods th.m.t. 512 775 151
Steel beams and channels th.m.t. 428 765 179
Iron and steel pipes th.m.t. 966 1,100 114
Copper th.m.t. 160.9 210 131
Nickel m.t. 8,660 17,200 199
Electric power bill.kwh 48.3 54.3" 112
Electric power plants mill.kw 11.3 12.4 110
Coal mill.m.t. 165.9 190.8 115
Coke mill.m.t. 21.1 23.8 113
Crude petroleum mill.m.t. 31.1 34.6 111
Natural gas th.m.t. 2,400 3,435 143
Peat th.m.t. 33,200 39,615 119
Soda ash th.in.t. 536 673 126
Phosphoric fertilizer th.m.t. 1,352 1,980" 146
Ground natural phosphate th.m.t. 381.7 610 160
Synthetic dyes th.m.t. 33.9 39.5 117
Rosin th.m.t. 44.1 60.8b 138
Paper th.m.t. 812.4 969.9" 119
Paperboard th.m.t. 150.8 208.3" 138
Motor vehicle tires thousands 3,007 4,000 133
Red bricks millions 6,723 8,359b 124
Fire-clay bricks th.m.t. 1,731 1,850 107
Quartzite bricks th.m.t. 546 670 123
Sand-lime, silica, and slag
bricks millions 732 1,083" 148
Cement th.m.t. 5,675 7,998 141
Construction gypsum th.ni.t. 892 1,306b 146
Industrial timber hauled mill.m3 117.9 159.0" 135
Lumber mill.m3 34.8 303" 87
Roofing iron th.m.t. 103.4 230.0 222
Asbestos shingles millions 205.6 253.4" 123
Window glass mill.m2 44.7 62.2" 139
Railroad ties millions 37.1 46.5 125
Rubberoid roofing th.rolls 1,700 2,556" 150
Pergamin subroofing th.rolls 1,190 2,500 210
Tar-paper roofing th.rolls 3,900 4,495b 115
Railroad rails th.m.t. 874.8 1,100 126
Sorted asbestos th.m.t. 147.0 200.0 136
Asphalt th.m.t. 74.4 150 202






1940 Planned of 1940
Unit OutputaOutput Output
Raw cotton th.m.t. 2,495 3,010 121
Iron ore mill.m.t. 29.87 34.03 114
Manganese ore mill.m.t. 2.6 3.1 121
Automobiles thousands 5.5 9.0 164
Trucks and buses thousands 139.9 131.0 94
Diesel and electric
locomotives units 14 16 114
Steam locomotives units 914 1,300 142
Railroad freight cars thousands 30.9 60.5b 196
Railroad passenger cars units 1,051 900 86
Tractors (cxci. garden) thousands 31.6 28.0 88
Plows, tractor-drawn thousands 38.4 35.4 92
Cultivators, tractor-drawn thousands 32.3 32.5 101
Drills, tractor-drawn thousands 21.4 33.5 157
Grain combines thousands 12.8 13.0 102
Haymowers, tractor-drawn thousands 3.3 3.0 91
Grain-cleaning machines thousands 4.3 2.3b 53
Steam boilers th.m2 276.3 272" 98
Water turbines th.kw 207.7 280.6 135
Diesel engines th.hp 248.7 368 148
Other internal combustion
engines th.hp 165 165.3 100
Turbogenerators th.kw 313.5 644.5 206
Hydroelectric generators th.kw 154.6 379.3 245
Electric motors (a.c.) th.kw 1,848 2,622 142
Power transformers th.kva 3,500 5,120" 146
Coal-cutting machines units 1,256 1,860 148
Machine tools thousands 58.4 58.1" 99
Bench and engine lathes thousands 11.5 13.8 120
Spinning machines units 1,109 2,000 180
Looms units 1,800 3,150 175
Cotton-carding machines units 1,312 1,970 150
Typesetting machines,
linotype units 145 120 83
Flat-bed printing presses units 258 260 101
Industrial sewing machines thousands 20.3 18.0 89
Excavators units 274 490 179
Scrapers, tractor-driven units 2,104 2,000 95
Railroad cranes,
steam-operated units 258 145 56
Automatic switchboards th.lines 37.5 61.5 164
Metallurgical equipment th.m.t. 23.7 45.0 190
Equipment for oil industry th.m.t. 15.5 22.0 142
Macaroni th.m.t. 324 392.lb 121
Butter th.m.t. 226 251" 111
Vegetable oil th.m.t. 798 737 92
Oleomargarine th.m.t. 121 126.5b 105
Cheese th.m.t. 38.0 44.5" 117











Sausages th.m.t. 391.3 395.6" 101
Fish catch th.rn.t. 1,404 1,704b 121
Soap th.imt. 700 748" 107
Salt th.m.t. 4,400 4,780 109
Raw sugar th.m.t. 2,165 2,745b 127
Yeast th.m.t. 48 77b 160
Canned food mill.cans 1,113 1,263b 113
Beer th.hcctoliters 12,130 13,450" 111
Cigarettes billions 100.4 1 14.2b 114
Matches th.crates 10,000 12,270" 123
Vodka mill.decaliters 92.5 95.7" 103
Confectionery th.m.t. 790 1,098" 139
Boots and shoes mill.pairs 211.0 223.6" 106
Rubber footwear mill.pairs 69.7 82.4b 118
Cotton yarn th.m.t. 650 716" 110
Cotton fabrics mill.m 3,954 4,402" 111
Linen fabrics mill.m 285.2 293.7" 103
Silk and rayon fabrics mill.m 76.6 80.8b 105
Woolen and worsted fabrics mill.m 119.7 128.8b 108
Knitted goods millions 183.0 195.2b 107
Hosiery milI.pairs 485.4 550.9b 113
Felt footwear mill.pairs 17.9 18.3 102
Rubber galoshes mill.pairs 45.0 55,5b 123
Bicycles thousands 255.0 402.0" 158
Electric light bulbs millions 139.8 142.0" 102
?honographs thousands 313.7 270.0 86
Radios thousands 160.5 355.0" 221
Clocks and watches thousands 2,796 3,405 122
Household refrigerators thousands 3.5 1.5 43
SOURCE: Appendix Table B-2 arid Statistical Abstract of Industrial Output in the Soviet
Union, 1913—1955, New York, NBER, 1956.
BOnSoviet territory as of end of 1940.
b Planned output as given in source adjusted upward to cover acquired Baltic territories.
For latter planned output, see plan 194!, pp. 704 if.
DEFICIENCIES AND DISTORTIONS IN PUBLISHED DATA48
Whatever one may conclude about the existence of dual accounts—and
the weight of evidence seems to bear against their existence—it is clear
that published statistics suffer from lack of reliability because of selectivity,
ambiguity, and misrepresentation.For the moment, we shall be con-
cerned prImarily with the last two.
48Thissection is based largely on tabular material and notes in Statistical Abstract of
Industrial Output in the Soviet Union, 1913—1955, New York, NBER, 1956. Examples of
defective statistics, in addition to those given here, may be found in Grossman, Soviet
Statistics, pp. 117 if.
37THE DATA:
TABLE 2
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PLANNED OUTPUT FOR 1941
AS A PERCENTAGE OF ACTUAL OUTPUT IN 1940:
SOVIET UNIoN, 119 INDUSTRIES
1941 Planned Output






























An important source of ambiguity isfailure to clarify the precise
coverage of industries.It is sometimes doubtful whether a published
datum refers to the sector of an industry under ministerial jurisdiction
or to the whole, to large-scale (or state) industry or to the whole, and so
on.In some cases there is doubt about territorial coverage.These
shortcomings been remedied in large measure in the recent Soviet
statistical abstracts, but some remain, in particular for that stretch of
years in which statistics were most heavily suppressed.It is asserted in
the Soviet abstracts for both 1936 and 1957 that all data refer to entire
industries except where specifically noted to the contrary. Yet examples
can be found where all or a substantial portion of small-scale production
is not included in early years (e.g., soap, beer, boots and shoes, silk
fabrics, and woolen and worsted fabrics), even though no warning is
given.
The treatment of the flour industry gives an example of ambiguity in
administrative coverage in earlier years. Until the recent appearance of
Industry of theUSSR,output of flour and groats had been published only
for the interwar period. In some years output was given for large-scale
industry, in later years for all industry except collective farm mills, and
in still later years for all industry producing flour from centralized
procurements of grain. This amounted to a temporal expansion in the
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coverage of the industry, not pointed out in the statistical sources, and
there was an illusion of substantial growth in output, whereas growth
was modest, at least according to the recently published data.
Another case of expanded coverage, not yet clarified, is provided by
industrial timber. The data apply to haulage Out of the State Forest
Reserve, accounting for almost all timber now but for only a fraction in
the 1 92O's. The prerevolutionary counterpart used in Soviet statistics—
the Crown Forests—accounted for an even smaller fraction. The chang-
ing coverage is not described in usual statistical sources, and the published
data therefore exaggerate growth in timber haulage from the pre-
revolutionary period to the present.49
The effects of territorial expansion during World War II are generally
not explicitly revealed in output statistics. Data for 1940 and later years
cover the expanded territory, while data for earlier years cover the inter-
war territory.Recently, output of some industries has been given for
1913 within the expanded territory, but this does not indicate the gains in
1940 through territorial acquisitions.5°
Product coverage of industries is less well known than administrative
coverage.Uncertainty about stage of fabrication and composition of
products applies to standard industrial materials as well as to more highly
fabricated products. For instance, it is not known whether the recent
data for nonferrous metals refer to only primary metal or both primary
and secondary metal, nor is it known at what stage of fabrication output is
measured. These are matters of some importance: recent output of copper
in the United States is more than doubled by moving from a definition
covering only blister copper produced from domestic ore to a defini-
tion covering all types of refined copper.5' In the case of more hetero-
geneous items (such as ball bearings, machine tools, cameras, and so on),
vagueness in definitions is even more serious, particularly since output is
often reported in units, actual or conventional.52 Again, the main de-
ficiency of Soviet statistics is inadequate detail, in this case, of product
groups. And, again, the situation has improved recently.
Definitions of industries are not only vague but also subject to change
Thedata on timber haulage used in our study have been adjusted to provide
comparable coverage for all years.
Ithas been possible to estimate those gains for some industries on the basis of output
in the acquired territories in 1937 (see Appendix Table B-3).
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1956, Washington, 1956, p. 750.
Ball-bearing units may vary from one used in bicycles requiring fifty seconds to
manufacture and weighing a few grams to one used in railway cars requiring twenty-six
hours to manufacture and weighing forty kilograms (see Planovoe khoziaistvo [Planned
Economy], 1956, No. 5, p. 82).
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without notice. Changes of this sort are, of course, often unavoidable—
even desirable—and are to be condemned only when they are obscured.
Usually a change is signaled by a slight alteration in terminology. It may
be the dropping or adding of a qualifying phrase. In the course of our
study, we did not find a single instance in which attention was directed
by statistical sources to a change in definition. The investigator is left
to his own devices in finding out whether there has been a change,
what it means, and how it affects comparability of data. Frequently, a
shift in definition will become known only through curious inconsistencies
in fragmentary information uncovered in the course of research.It may
be helpful to expand on this matter by giving a few specific examples.
Up to 1949, the "mineral fertilizer" industry covered soluble super-
phosphates, nitrates, and potassic compounds.The most important
product not included was ground natural phosphate, an unprocessed
material that is not readily soluble. Coverage was expanded in 1949 to
bring in this product, and output was thereby inflated by about an eighth.
Aside from some inconsistencies in data that arose, the only sign of a
change at the time was the following alteration in title: up to 1949, the
industry had been called "mineral fertilizers (superphosphates, nitrates,
and potash)"; since 1949, the parenthetical phrase has been dropped.
The nature of the change was confirmed when output series for the com-
ponents appeared in Industry of the USSR. No mention is made of the
expansion in coverage over series appearing in earlier sources.
The term "canned food" has covered a variety of products, differing in
many instances with the sources giving data.Little is known about the
composition of products since the middle 1930's, but a significant relaxa-
tion in the meaning of the term took place in the early1 93O's, never
described in detail in primary statistical sources. Up to that time,
"canned food" had been used to mean food packed in hermetically
sealed containers;at some point in the early l930's, it came to mean
any kind of preserved food, no matter how packed.Thus,
foods packed in bulk—as pickles in the the barrel and salt pork—
apparently came to be taken in under the name "canned food."In
1934, hermetically sealed products accounted for less than a third of
"canned food." Recent information indicates that "canned food" still
includes products not hermetically sealed. At the same time, output for
the 1930's has beeh revised substantially downward, which suggests that
some of the bulk products—we do not know which ones—have been
removed from coverage.
A similar shift in coverage of the "confectionery" industry seemingly
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took place around the beginning of the Plan period, when cakes and other
baked goods were added to the candy already included. During the
interwar years, these bakery goods accounted for between 30 and 40
per cent of the output of "confectionery."It seems probable that better
grades of bread were also classified as "confectionery" when bread
rationing was in effect during the early thirties (there was only one grade
of rationed bread).Information for the postwar period shows that
bakery goods are still included, but it has never been pointed out that
the definition of "confectionery" is considerably broader than for early
years.
By tracing through changes in terminology, one notes that the coverage
of the "meat" industry has been expanded at least twice. Data for 1930
and later years are given in Soviet sources as applying to "meat and meat
products," whereas for earlier years they are given for slaughter weight
of meat alone.This expansion in coverage presumably amounted to
counting some meat products twice: once at the slaughtering stage and
again at the processing stage. A second shift in coverage took place with
the publication of The National Economy of the USSR; in this source, the
industry is called "meat and by-products of Category I," an unexplained
expansion in coverage—lard seems to have been added, among other
things—that raised output by about a quarter.
Examples could be multiplied, but it is perhaps sufficient to conclude
with brief comments on a few other cases. Up to 1928, "soap" included
only the common bar soaps used for laundering; after that date, coverage
was expanded to include all types of soap.Similarly, the term "leather
footwear" originally included only boots and shoes made of leather but
later came to include all kinds of footwear—even rebuilt shoes—except
those made entirely of felt or rubber. In the case of "vegetable oil," the
output for 1928 given in the recent statistical abstracts apparently covers
only edible oil, whereas output for later years covers nonedible oil as
well. During the pre-Plan period, the "fish catch" included only those
fish caught by commercial fishermen;during the Plan period, fish
caught in ponds by collective farmers and other local fishermen have
also been included, though one may wonder how this is estimated.
In some heterogeneous industries, the output of component products
is often aggregated by means of "conventional units."In some cases,
Soviet practice differs sharply from Western usage, and the failure of
Soviet sources to describe the practice makes it difficult to avoid misinter-
pretation.For instance, many block-like and brick-like construction
materials seem to be counted as "brick," and their output is apparently
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expressed in some kind of brick equivalents. The output of flat glass is
measured in square meters—as in the United States—but only after the
different kinds of glass have been converted in an unknown way to con-
ventional units equivalent to window glass with a standard thickness of
2 millimeters. Neither of these procedures is noted or described in primary
Soviet sources.
A few specific examples drawn from the technical literature illustrate
the complex nature of conventional units. Output of "canned food" is
said in statistical sources to be expressed in terms of a conventional can•
of 400 grams. In fact, the standard unit for hermetically sealed products
is a container with a volume of 353.4 cubic centimeters, multiplied by
coefficients varying with the product. Thus, beef stew of first and superior
grades has a coefficient of 1.13; lamb stew of first grade, 1.2; and lamb
stew of superior grade, 1.4.For "canned goods" packed in bulk, the
standard unit is a net weight of 400 grams, multiplied by a coefficient
varying with density. The rationale for these coefficients is not apparent,
unless they are designed to reflect presumed qualitative differences.
Similar coefficients are known to be used in the cases of shoes, sausages,
lumber, plywood, iron and steel products, producer equipment, agricul-
tural equipment, forest products, and building materials.53 One Soviet
economist, M. A. Tseitlin, states that all but a handful of the output
targets listed in the Fourth Five Year Plan were actually expressed in
conventional units, involving conversion coefficients of various types,
even though they were said to be measured in "physical units." Among
the few exceptions were electricity, petroleum, natural gas, and most
processed foods.54
The stage of fabrication at which output is measured sometimes does
not accord with Western practice, and since it is not revealed in primary
sources, one may be misled about productive activity. In most countries,
the output of cotton fabrics is recorded at the unfinished or "gray goods"
stage. This was also the case with Tsarist statistics. During the l930's,
Soviet statistics began recording output at the finished stage, after dyeing
and finishing. This change in practice has taken on significance in the
postwar period, since substantial quantities of cotton goods' have come
to be produced in Poland for export to the Soviet Union.It is quite
possible that these Polish exports are gray goods later finished in the
Soviet Union and hence counted as Soviet output. The same may also
"Thisparagraph is based on S. A. Gorelik, Statistika [Statistics], Moscow, 1956,
pp. 29 if; and Grossman, Soviet Statistics, pp. 119 f.
Ibid.
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be true for railway equipment produced in Poland but "finished" (by,
say, painting and labeling) in the Soviet Union.
On the other side, there are cases where it is not made clear that output
is being measured at primary stages of fabrication. "Granulated sugar"
(sakhar pesok), for instance, apparently includes all sugars and syrups
(converted into "sugar equivalents") at the crudest processing stage.
A part is used directly for household consumption, a part is further
processed into "refined sugar," and a part is consumed industrially.
Similarly, "vegetable oil" includes that consumed directly and that used
in making other products (for instance, margarine).
We have already given incidental illustrations of how the ordinary
user of Soviet statistics can be badly mistaken about the meaning of
terms, because they diverge from customary usage. Two examples may
be added:"silk fabrics" is the title used to identify all fabrics made in
wholeor in part from artificial and synthetic fibers as well as from silk,
and "slate" is the title used to identify asbestos shingles.
Misleading language reached its zenith in the postwar years before
1956, a period in which statistics lost all vestiges of being a science and
became instead a linguistic art. The practices then followed are illustrated
by the case of machine tools.In the postwar announcements of annual
percentage increases in output, data were published under no fewer than
four different titles for the machine tool industry, varying from one year
to the next. A complete series of percentages was not published under
any one of these titles. In the general literature, the product was sometimes
times referred to as "machine tools" (stanki) and sometimes as "metal-
cutting machine tools" (stanki metallorezhushchie).It appears from the
recent Soviet statistical abstracts that the former include forges and
presses while the latter do not.Similarly, output was sometimes referred
to as "deliveries" or "sales" (vypusk) and sometimes as "production"
(produktsiia). This confused mixture of terms made it impossible to know
what was going on in this sector of industry, though careless use of
thepublishedfigurescouldleadtoanexaggeratedpictureof
performance.
This discussion may be concluded with a few words on the Soviet
concept of output According to formal requirements, the product
of an enterprise is supposed to be counted as output only when it has
passed quality inspection and when it has been delivered to a warehouse
or buyer. Goods rejected for failure to meet standards of quality, either
by inspectors within a plant or by buyers, are classified as brak and are
supposed to be excluded from output.But this provision is formally
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operative only if the defective goods are discovered and reported within
the year in which they are produced, a loophole that would seem to
encourage bunching shipments of brak around the end of a year.55In
addition, the standards of quality are low in some industries, and brak
may mean "most defective."56 Finally, quality inspection leaves much
to be desired, as Soviet authorities complain.57 As Grossman reports:
"A safer and clearly very widespread method of writing up output is the
inclusion of brak in the reported amount of finished product.Direct
references in the Soviet press, eyewitness testimony, and the continual
complaints about the substandard quality of industrial products bear
such ample and conclusive evidence of the prevalence of this practice in
Soviet industry, despite severe criminal and administrative sanctions
against it, that it is not necessary to dwell on it further at this point."58
The concrete effects of this practice will be revealed in more detail in
the next chapter.
A more specialized problem of interpretation has to do with the
measuring of output in machinery industries.As late as 1938, it was
common practice in the power equipment industry to count a complex
machine as produced whenever a piece of auxiliary equipment was
completed. Thus a steam turbine would be reported as produced when
its condenser pump, say, was finished.It was said to be normal for two
years to pass between the recording of production of final products
(such as turbines) and the actual completion; one case was cited in which
five years passed.59It is, of course, conceivable that the final product
would never be produced. There is no way of knowing whether this
See ibid.,pp.66and 70 if. An apparent recent example of such bunching is given in
the article on the Altai Tractor Plant, Current Digest, X, 3, p. 27.
In the late 1930's, there were three "standard" grades of textiles and at least three
"substandard" grades. It appears that only the worst of the latter qualified as bra/c, since
the first two "substandard" grades were offered for sale. For a description of the standards
of quality for textiles in those years, see P. Fadeev and D. Zamkovskii, "0 kachestve
standartov tekstil'nykh tovarov" [On the Worth of the Standards for Textiles], Voprosy
sovetskoi lorgouli [Problems of Soviet Trade], 1936, No. 10, pp. 35—42. The following
quotation (p. 38), which has to do with varying "standard" grades, is enlightening:
"A consumer who buys three meters of drapery fabric that looks moth-eaten and has all
the colors of the rainbow—i.e., is completely useless—receives at best a 7 per cent reduc-
tion in price if the fabric is third quality. But if this defect is only in those three meters,
then the reduction is only 3 per cent because the fabric is second quality, although it
makes absolutely no difference to the consumer who buys that piece whether the defect
is in all the material or just in his piece.If the defect is only 2.99 meters long, then the
fabric is first quality."
Grossman, Soviet Statistics, pp. 87 if.
58Ibid.,p. 68. For a careful discussion of the problem of brak, see Berliner, Factory and
Manager, Chapter IX.
I. Nelidov, "Somnitel'nye metody planirovaniia" [Doubtful Planning Methods],
Mashinostroeniia [Machine Building], September 30, 1938.
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practice has continued into the postwar years, but it certainly was impor-
tant in the interwar period.
INTERNAL EVIDENCE ON RELIABILITY
The evidence suggests that data on physical output are generally less
accurate in the Soviet Union than in the West. There can be little doubt
that Soviet data are generally exaggerated by a significant amount—
precisely how much it is impossible to know. Nevertheless, one must not
move from this conclusion to a far broader one, namely, that the data
are wholly unreliable and useless.They are not a mere collection of
numbers taken out of the air. The internal relations among the statistics
demonstrate that they are based on reality, even though they diverge
from it.In considering this internal evidence, we shall pass from the
least conclusive to the most.
The first thing to be mentioned is that there is a basic consistency
among data relating to differing administrative coverages:the larger
the coverage, the larger the figures. This is in itself not very meaningful,
since the first thing that would be attended to in manipulation of statistics
would be this kind of elementary consistency.It is more meaningful for
the 1920's than for later years, because two agencies (VSNKhand TsSU),
functioning independently in this regard, collected data for different
administrative coverages.
The consistency of data for related products is more significant.For
example, in the iron and steel complex the series for iron ore, pig iron,
coke, steel ingots, and rolled steel move more or less together, and at the
same time diverge in accord with known developments. Since 1928, iron
ore production has risen more percentagewise than pig iron production
because of deterioration in the quality of ore; pig iron has risen less than
steel ingots because of increased use of scrap; and steel ingots have risen
more than rolled products because of increased use of castings and forg-
ings.Similarly, output of electric power has grown more rapidly than
installed capacity, which is consistent with known trends toward a more
even consumption of electricity during the day and over the year. In the
textile industry, production has grown more rapidly for cotton than for
cotton fabrics, while it has grown less rapidly for wool than for woolen
fabrics. Both these divergences are consistent with decreased reliance on
imports of cotton, with reduced length of staple, and with increased use
of cotton in woolen fabrics. Many more examples of this kind could be
given, but these suffice to make the point.
The third line of internal evidence turns about the fact that selectivity
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and ambiguity are used to conceal whatever it is desired to conceal.
Poor performance is habitually masked by silence or evasion. Cases are
known of slow-growing and declining industries where no effort has been
made to publish data to the contrary; instead, nothing is said at all.
In a few cases, like flour milling, data have been ultimately released
confirming the worst of Western suspicions. During the postwar years
when only annual percentage changes in output were being reported,
industries with declines were simply omitted from the list;recently
published statistics reveal that some of the declines were substantial
(e.g., for many machinery items in 1952). This all merely provides clear
evidence that black has not been indiscriminately turned into white in
the basic Soviet statistics on physical output.
At the same time the difficulties attributable to the policy of secrecy
must not be overlooked. At least until very recently, published Soviet
statistics have been carefully selected. To illustrate the selectivity, we
may consider frequency distributions of annual relatives of output for
three different samples of industries:the first (sample A), as published
up to the end of 1955; the second (sample B), as published up to the end
of 1956; and the third (sample C), as published up to the end of 1957
(see Table 3).These samples are not strictly comparable in nature.
Sample A merely contains all the annual percentage changes in output
as announced in reports of plan fulfillment, and the industries covered
therefore vary substantially from year to year. Moreover, a number of
minor industries and industries with fluctuating product coverage are
included. Samples B and C, on the other hand, are composed of industries
with essentially continuous output series over the period surveyed. The
earlier samples show an upward bias relative to the later ones. The tail
of the frequency distributions containing relatives below 100 per cent—
i.e., representing industries with annual declines in output—tends to
grow increasingly longer as we move from sample A to sample C in each
year.In fact, no declines in output are shown in sample A except for
1955. Similarly, the median annual relative—that relative exceeded and
fallen short of by half the industries—tends to decline as we move from
sample A to sample C. These frequency distributions may be compared
with a similar set of distributions for the industries included in the Federal
Reserve Board index of U.S. industrial production (see Table 4). The
Soviet distributions for sample C accord much more closely in nature with
the American distributions than do the Soviet distributions for samples
A and B. We note the reduction in bias as more statistics have been
revealed. We have no way of knowing whether or how much the bias
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TABLE 3
FREQ,UENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ANNUAL RELATIVES OF PHYSICAL OUTPUT FOR











9OtolOO 1 1 1
100 to 110 4 4 6 10 10 14
110 to 120 15 11 19 28 21 29
120 to 130 22 21 29 23 24 33
130 to 140 16 12 17 8 7 10
140to150 4 6 7 3 3 5
150to160 6 3 7 3 2 2
160to170 2 3 3 1 1 1
170to180 4 3 4 1
180to190 1 1 2 1 1
190to200 1 1 2 1 1 1
200 and over 5 3 2
Total 80 69 96 80 72 100
Median (%) 130 129 128 121 121 121
1951 1952
Under 60 2 5
60to70 1 1
70to80 5 3 4
80to90 2 11 1 9
9OtolOO 2 13 7 17
100 to 110 10 11 32 28 25 52
110 to 120 35 35 51 24 18 49
120 to 130 15 12 28 15 8 20
130to140 9 3 8 4 4 4
140to150 3 4 3 2 4
150tp160 3 2 1 1
160to170 2 1
170to180 1 2 1
180to190 1 1 1
190to200 1 1 1
200 and over 3 1 10 1 2
Total 78 69 173 77 69 171








(percent) A B C A B C
1953 1954
Under 60 1 2
6Oto7O 1
70to80 3 1 3
8Oto9Q 1 3 1 2
9OtolOO 4 14 2 14
100 to 110 22 23 48 27 25 48
110 to 120 37 36 55 37 31 60
120 to 130 13 9 25 11 9 15
l3Otol4O 5 3 2 4
l4Otol5O 5 2 5 3 1 6
150to160 2 4 2 1 2
160to170 2 2 2
l7Otol8O 1 1 1 1 1 3
180 to 190 1
l9Oto200 1 2
200 andover 2 2 5 5 1 9
Total 87 81 170 95 77 172





BOto9O 1 2 11
9OtolOO 2 5 15
100 to 110 28 23 45
llOtol2O 31 35 55
120 to 130 18 12 24
l3Otol4O 5 2 6
l4Otol5O 2 1 6





200 and over 1 1 2
Total 95 82 176
Median (%) 115 113 112
SOURCE:SampleA: StatisticalAbstract of Industrial Output in the Soviet Union, Supplement,
Table 3. Sample B: ibid.,Part1. Sample C: Appendix B.
aSampleA refers to output data published upto end of 1955; Sample B, up to end
of1956; and Sample C, up to end of 1957.
b Output in specified year as percentage of preceding year.
48KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS
TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTIONS OF ANNUAL RELATIVES OF PHYSICAL OUTPUT OF INDUSTRIES




























































































Total 193 193 193 193 193 193
Median (%) 103.5 92.4 116.3 103.7 99.5 105,6
SOURCE: Special computation by the Federal Reserve Board.
would be reduced by a full disclosure of data comparable to the practices
followed in the United States.
Another aspect of selectivityis suppression of information about
industries related to the military effort.Since production in these areas
has generally grown faster than the average for all industry, this policy
imparts a downward bias to the sample of published output data.In
some cases (like nonferrous metals and chemicals), we cannot be sure
whether data are suppressed because growth has been fast or because it
has been slow.It is even likely that much secrecy is simply due to the
traditional Russian love of mystery.
The fourth and most important line of internal evidence on the relia-
bility of Soviet data has to do with the reasonableness of the patterns of
growth that emerge from published Soviet data. The sector known as
heavy industry is shown to have grown much more rapidly than the
sector known as light industry;this certainly accords with general
conditions, as every traveler to the Soviet Union can testify.To the
person who has studied economic growth in other countries, it is more
important to note that there is a general tendency among Soviet industries
to grow more slowly percentagewise as they get older and larger, a
phenomenon that goes by the name of "retardation in growth"; in this
respect, the behavior of the Soviet economy has been quite similar to the
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behavior of other economies about which a good deal more is known.
Along the same lines, the published Soviet data show that the rates of
growth of Soviet industries have been closely related to the stages of
development from which they started:in general, those industries that
were least "advanced" in the prerevolutionary years relative to other
countries have grown most rapidly, while those most "advanced" have
grown least rapidly. There is also a general consistency in the stage of
development of related groups of Soviet industries, as determined by
comparisons with various periods of development in the American
economy.Finally, there is a basic consistency between transportation
and industrial statistics, similar in important respects to the relation
holding for the United States in earlier periods of development. There is
also a reasonable relation between industrial employment and output.
These matters are discussed more concretely later on and need not be
elaborated here. The point to be made at this time is that the available
Soviet data on physical output present a picture of growth patterns that
makes sense.
Some Generalizations About Soviet Data
The evidence bearing on the reliability of Soviet data cannot be summed
up in a few words, nor can simple judgments be made. The degree of
reliability depends on the purposes for which the data are to be used.
In general, absolute magnitudes of physical output are likely to be less
accurate than for Western statistics.Similarly, the products to which the
data apply are less easily identified. These shortcomings are likely to be
less pronounced in industries of high priority, especially if output is subject
to rather precise measurement. Thus data on the output of coal are
undoubtedly more reliable than those on the output of meat because one
has had a higher priority than the other; and data on the output of steel
ingots are probably more reliable than those on the output of coal,
because one is measured more precisely—and can be checked more
precisely—than the other. The shortcomings in absolute magnitudes are
most important when levels of output in the Soviet Union are being
compared with levels elsewhere. They are somewhat less important when
growth trends in Soviet output are being considered, for there is little
evidence of a systematic trend in the relative inaccuracy of data, except
that data for prerevolutionary and early Soviet years are generally
understated in comparison with those for later years. The defects are
even less important when percentage movements are being compared
among Soviet industries.
We may illustrate with a concrete example. We should allow a wide
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margin of error in comparing Soviet and American outputs of cotton
fabrics:the products are not the same, the units of measurement are
not the same, and the Soviet data have an upward bias in addition. The
margin of error is probably less significant if the growth of the Soviet
cotton fabrics industry is being considered, particularly if growth is being
discussed in terms of annual average rates. There is almost certainly an
upward bias in the percentage growth over the Soviet period as a whole
(because of relative understatement of earlier data), but probably not over
some later stretches of years. Finally, the margin of error is likely to be
smaller still when comparisons are made between Soviet growth rates for,
say, cotton fabrics and steel.Bearing the necessary qualifications in
mind and exercising care along the way, we can use Soviet data on
physical output to sketch a picture of Soviet industrial growth.
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